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Background: In several European countries, medical assistance in dying (MAID) is no
longer confined to persons with a terminal prognosis but is also available to those
suffering from persistent and unbearable mental illness. To date, scholarly discourse on
MAID in this population has been dominated by issues such as decision-making capacity,
uncertainty as to when a disease is incurable, stigmatization, isolation, and loneliness.
However, the issue of perceived burdensomeness has received little attention.
Objective: The study explores the possible impact of perceived burdensomeness on
requests for MAID among persons with severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI).
Method: Using the method of ethical argumentation, we discuss the issue of access
to MAID for persons with SPMI and perceived burdensomeness.
Conclusion: Perceived burdensomeness may be a contributing factor in the wish
for hastened death among persons with SPMI. MAID is ethically unsupportable if SPMI
causes the individual to make an unrealistic assessment of burdensomeness, indicating
a lack of decision-making capacity in the context of that request. However, the possibility
that some individuals with SPMI may perceive burdensomeness does not mean that they
should be routinely excluded from MAID. For SPMI patients with intact decision-making
capacity who feel their life is not worth living, perceived burdensomeness as a component
of this intolerable suffering is not a sufficient reason to deny access to MAID.
Keywords: suicide, euthanasia, depression, schizophrenia, anorexia nervosa, ethics, autonomy, mental
competency
INTRODUCTION
Despite all best efforts to treat mental illness and promote recovery, some patients develop
a severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI) that overwhelms their life, such as severe
treatment-refractory major depressive disorder, extremely disabling chronic schizophrenia, or
anorexia nervosa [(1, 2); for a systematic review of definitions of SPMI, see (3)]. Patients
with SPMI should be offered all treatment options, including palliative care (4). In addition,
however, it is important to interrogate the ethics of allowing individuals with SPMI to access
medical assistance in dying (MAID). This encompasses both euthanasia, where the physician
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administers the lethal drug, and physician-assisted dying, where
the physician only prescribes the drug, and the patient actively
takes it [e.g., (5)]. Although reforms to facilitate MAID are
motivated mainly by the unbearable suffering of terminally ill
patients and are confined to that population, similar ethical
arguments can be applied to those with no terminal condition.
As outlined below, some jurisdictions already allow persons
with SPMI to access MAID. However, many do not, and
some authors have proposed that MAID should be extended
in all jurisdictions to psychiatric conditions (6, 7). According
to Schuklenk and van de Vathorst (7), “Jurisdictions that are
considering, or that have, decriminalized physician assisted
dying are discriminating unfairly against patients suffering from
treatment-resistant depression if they exclude such patients from
the class of citizens entitled to receive assistance in dying”
(p. 577).
To begin, it is useful to briefly summarize the current
legal situation regarding MAID in various jurisdictions.
In the Netherlands, existing legislation exempts physicians
participating in MAID (including euthanasia) from criminal
liability in nonterminal cases where the physician believes,
among other things, that the patient’s suffering is “lasting and
unbearable” (8–10). In Belgium, mental illness is explicitly
recognized as permissible grounds for MAID (including
euthanasia) when the suffering is constant and cannot
be otherwise alleviated (9–12). In Luxembourg, MAID
(including euthanasia) is permitted if an individual has a
severe and incurable illness and “constant unbearable physical
or psychological suffering” if the individual’s request for MAID
is stable over time (10–13). In Switzerland, MAID (assisted
suicide but not euthanasia) is legally unrestricted for patients
with serious, incurable, and chronic mental illness [(10, 12, 14)1].
In those jurisdictions that allow MAID in cases of SPMI,
one important criterion is that the patient must be experiencing
intolerable physical or psychological suffering. However,
participants often differ about the meaning of “intolerable
suffering” (15). Most scholars have argued that suffering is purely
subjective and can only be appraised by the patient (2, 16, 17),
and unbearable suffering has been defined as “a subjective
experience of suffering that is so serious and uncontrollable that
it overwhelms ones bearing capacity [. . . ]” [(18), p. 2]. This is not
generally limited to physical causes of suffering such as pain or
other somatic symptoms but includes psychological symptoms
or social difficulties (2, 16, 18). It has been previously argued
that, on this view, MAID may be in the patient’s best interest and
should therefore be an available option (19). The core argument
here is that maximizing the patient’s autonomy in choosing
his/her own way of dying also minimizes their suffering (20).
Perceived burdensomeness has been defined as the “[. . . ]
perception that one is a burden or drain on significant others
[. . . ]” [(21), p. 631] or a burden on society (21, 22). To
1In Ruling 03.11.2006 2A.48/, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland noted:
“Where the wish to die is based on an autonomous and all-embracing decision, it
is not prohibited to prescribe sodium pentobarbital to a person suffering from a
psychiatric illness and, consequently, to assist him or her in committing suicide...”
[6.3.5.1] [translation drawn from Haas v Switzerland (2011) ECHR 2422].
date, this issue has received little attention in the scholarly
discourse on MAID, probably because the concept of perceived
burdensomeness is difficult to grasp, as it involves both the
patient’s subjective feelings and the objective external reality,
which may conflict. As the issue is also emotionally charged,
it is all the more important to discuss the associated ethical
considerations as objectively as possible and without prejudice.
Perceived burdensomeness is central to MAID decision
making from two perspectives. First, the patient might choose
MAID because they perceive themselves to be a burden to
relatives or society and wish to free others from that burden. As
there may be some felt pressure to do so, choosing MAID might
not be a completely autonomous decision. Second, the patient’s
perception that they are a burden for caregivers may form part
of the intolerable suffering that is prerequisite of legal eligibility
for MAID. What, then, distinguishes perceived burdensomeness
from other aspects of intolerable suffering? In the first place, it is
important to note that both are subjective and therefore difficult
to assess objectively. On the one hand, perceived burdensomeness
is a purely psychological rather than a partly physical aspect
of intolerable suffering, making it more difficult to grasp. On
the other hand, perceived burdensomeness depends on external
factors as well as on the individual. This is a significant source of
difficulty, as a person’s preference for MAID should not be driven
by external factors.
Among the internal aspects of perceived burdensomeness,
the individual’s sense of autonomy is very important, and this
may be violated by a constant need for care. Even with the
best of care, this aspect of perceived burdensomeness cannot
be changed from without, as it is an element of SPMI precisely
because of its persistence. We assume here that a chronic and
persistent disorder of this kind may entail a chronic need for
care and dependence, unlike an acute psychiatric situation in
which that need is often transient, with the prospect of more
rapid improvement and at least partial independence. It seems
likely that dependence or need for care will be easier to bear if
it is transient rather than permanent or ongoing. At the same
time, it should be noted that a patient may perceive themselves
as a burden without experiencing this as part of their intolerable
suffering. In other words, they may recognize this but can accept
it, in which case perceived burdensomeness would not contribute
to their wish for MAID.
To address the question of allowing access to MAID for
persons with SPMI and perceived burdensomeness, we have
adopted the method of ethical argumentation. An argument is
ethical when some of its premises, as well as its conclusion,
make normative, value-laden claims as opposed to being merely
descriptive. This distinction between normative and descriptive
dates back to David Hume, who “[. . . ] noted a categorical
difference between the moments people talk about how things
are, and the moments people talk about how things ought to be
[. . . ]” [(23), p. 18].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: After first
outlining the relevance of perceived burdensomeness for some
individuals who express a desire for MAID, we go on to
examine the widely held view that persons with SPMI should be
routinely excluded from MAID because of the possible influence
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of perceived burdensomeness. The final section includes a brief
summary and a discussion of some practical implications.
PERCEIVED BURDENSOMENESS AS AN
INFLUENCE ON THE DESIRE FOR
HASTENED DEATH
Concern has previously been expressed that a causal factor in
some suicides is that the person in question had come to believe
they were a burden to others (21, 22, 24–27). The feeling or
fear of being a burden to others is often an important end-of-
life concern (10, 28), not only among the terminally ill but also
among healthy older adults (29). Perceived burdensomeness may
also play an important role in the wish to die or the wish for
hastened death (28, 30–37), and in requests for MAID (9, 25,
28, 30, 32, 36–38), extending even to a perceived “duty to die”
(36, 39). While most of these studies focused mainly on patients
with terminal physical illnesses, Groenwoud et al.’s (38) survey
of psychiatrists in the Netherlands found that being a burden to
others might also motivate requests for MAID among patients
with mental illness.
Although rarely alluded to in the academic literature, the
concern that perceived burdensomeness might be a causal factor
in suicide sometimes informs arguments by clinicians and non-
academics against MAID for patients with SPMI. The possibility
of psychiatric illness in patients with a terminal physical illness is
a prominent counter-argument against MAID in general because
of fears that such patients may view their situation as unduly
negative, thus influencing or even precipitating their wish for
MAID (6). For example, it is often argued that as well as
underestimating their chances of remission, depressed patients
may often feel guilty for being depressed and may consider
themselves completely worthless. Beck’s influential cognitive
theory of depression claims that automatic, spontaneous, and
seemingly uncontrollable negative thoughts and negative self-
schemas in depressed persons promote an irrationally negative
view of themselves, their future and the world in general (40).
This can lead to a sense of disgrace and loss of dignity, and
to a feeling or conviction that one is a burden to others. The
interpersonal psychological theory of suicidal behavior views
perceived burdensomeness as a major component of “suicidal
desire,” which corresponds more or less to suicidal ideation (21,
24). In their review of the concept, Hill and Pettit (21) claimed
there is “[. . . ] support for the incremental validity of perceived
burdensomeness as a predictor of suicidal ideation beyond the
effects of other well established risk factors” (p. 636). From
this perspective, it has been argued that contemporary mental
healthcare efforts to prevent suicide should include a focus on
perceived burdensomeness (21, 22, 25, 27).
SHOULD PERCEIVED BURDENSOMENESS
BE A REASON FOR REFUSING MAID TO
PERSONS WITH SPMI?
If SPMI renders one’s life unlivable, should perceived
burdensomeness as a component of that intolerable suffering be
considered a reason to deny access to MAID? As mentioned in
the Introduction, there are several ways of looking at perceived
burdensomeness. If a patient perceives themselves as a burden
but is unconcerned about this, any perceived burdensomeness
would not contribute to intolerable suffering or contribute to
their desire for MAID. On the other hand, a patient might wish
to free relatives and the society from this perceived burden or
might experience this as an external pressure, rendering their
decision less than completely autonomous. Additionally, if a
chronic need for care and dependence diminishes the individual’s
sense of autonomy, perceived burdensomeness may form part of
their intolerable suffering.
It follows that perceived burdensomeness per se should not
be a reason to deny access to MAID. Instead, each patient
should be carefully assessed to determine whether perceived
burdensomeness is a component of intolerable suffering, and
access to MAID should be denied only in cases where a mentally
ill person proves incompetent to make this judgment. Of course,
this argument is not specific to persons with SPMI, as it can
equally apply to those with a somatic illness. However, non-SPMI
patients with a somatic illness seem more likely to be able to
competently assess the reality of the burden on others. Persons
with SPMI are more likely to make an exaggerated estimation of
their burdensomeness that is a poor reflection of the objective
reality—for instance, as a consequence of negative thinking
in cases of depression. When these unrealistic perceptions
contribute significantly to the individual’s understanding of
relevant information in deciding to seek MAID, it can be argued
that their competence to make that decision is impaired. If that
impairment cannot be overcome with appropriate support2—for
example, by affording an opportunity to reflect on their perceived
burdensomeness with a trusted family member—then access to
MAID should be blocked.
As incapacity of this kind may be more common among those
with SPMI, it is reasonable to ask whether these individuals
should be routinely excluded from MAID because of the
possibility of perceived burdensomeness. It can equally be argued
that it is difficult or impossible for patients or clinicians to say
whether perceived burdensomeness is a valid factor independent
of their illness. It may also be difficult to determine the extent
to which perceived burdensomeness is rooted in the SPMI itself.
Persons with SPMI who feel that their suffering has not been
effectively alleviated over time may indeed represent a real
burden for their relatives. If those family members are involved in
decisions aboutMAID, patients may feel some pressure to choose
MAID because of their dependence on housing or financial
support (17, 42, 43).
There is also a risk that relatives may unconsciously or
unintentionally pressure the patient to seek MAID (17) and
that their opinion may play an important role in any such
decision, regardless of whether the patient has a mental illness
(9, 15, 38). For example, a patient might reject MAID because
their family is against this approach (17, 34). In one study of
2According to the UNCRPD, a person cannot be regarded as lacking decision-
making capacity unless it proves impossible to gain this capacity with appropriate
decision-making support [see, e.g., (41)].
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family members of patients who lacked decision-making capacity
(DMC), Winter and Parks (44) found that when there was any
disagreement, family members tended to favor life-prolonging
rather than palliative care approaches and that the decision was
influenced more by family members than by the patient’s own
preference. In some cases, patients might avoid speaking with
family members about the fear of being a burden and might
overestimate that burden by linking that feeling to the issue
of MAID (34). This might lead some patients to refuse MAID
because they perceive it as a burden on their families, prompting
troubling inner conflict and greater suffering (34). If a patient
also perceives themselves as a burden to society as a whole, this
may prompt a wish for hastened death (34). For example, some
authors have suggested that patients may be inclined to request
MAID because they feel they are a financial burden to society, and
that legalization of MAIDmay seem to confirm society’s desire to
ease that burden (32).
While estimates of their burdensomeness among patients who
suffer from severe and persistent depression and other SPMIs
may not be unrealistic, there is the risk that their judgment may
be undermined by negative thinking. Regarding the influence
of family or the wider society, it is essential to ensure that the
decision to seek MAID is not influenced by external factors
but is voluntary (6, 9, 32), and adequate exploration of all
these influences and their effects on patient decisions may prove
very difficult (32). In this regard, an ethics of care approach
offers another perspective on perceived burdensomeness as a
relational phenomenon involving the patient, their relatives,
their doctor, and society as a whole [e.g., (35, 37)]. These
influences on the patient must be considered carefully, as they
cannot be completely separated from the patient’s subjective
perceptions. While no external pressure should be exerted on
the patient in making a decision about MAID, the patient must
be seen as a relational being who will naturally take account
of those relationships in making any such decision. Future
research should take fuller account of these issues by integrating
this relational component in the discussion about perceived
burdensomeness, intolerable suffering, and MAID in patients
with SPMI.
Should the discussion about suicidal tendencies be included
in the discussion about MAID? As noted earlier, some authors
have discussed perceived burdensomeness as a factor in suicide
prevention (21, 22, 25, 27). This perspective is particularly
important when considering whether patients with SPMI should
be allowed to access MAID although possibly perceiving
themselves as a burden to others. Psychiatrists are trained to focus
on suicide prevention, and this may conflict with acceptance of
MAID for patients with mental illness (6, 7, 9, 17, 20, 45–47). For
that reason, it seems necessary to question the appropriateness
of conflating arguments for suicide prevention with arguments
about MAID, as recently discussed in relation to psychiatric
disorders (47). Because of certain “shared characteristics” (47, 48),
one might struggle to distinguish suicide “in the conventional
sense” (48) from MAID, and emergent expressions like “rational
suicide” (45, 46) highlight this struggle. We consider it important
not to conflate these two forms of dying, especially in the context
of SPMI.
When perceived burdensomeness is a component of
intolerable suffering, the key question is whether a person
who is mentally ill can make a competent judgment regarding
MAID. If patients with SPMI make unrealistic estimates of
their burdensomeness, DMC is impaired. Assuming that this
impairment cannot be overcome through supported decision
making and that an unrealistic perception of burdensomeness
influences the patient’s desire for MAID, access to MAID should
be denied. For that reason, DMC and perceived burdensomeness
should not be assessed as if completely independent of each
other. However, this does not mean that impaired DMC
regarding MAID inevitably leads to an unrealistic perception
of perceived burdensomeness. In general, DMC must be
independently re-evaluated for each component of the decision,
taking account of both their mutual influence and respective
realism. In discussing the question of whether MAID should
be allowed on the basis of not wishing to be a burden to others,
Bleek (32) concluded that MAID might be permissible for
patients with terminal somatic illness. However, he excluded
patients with depression because of a possible lack of patient
DMC and possible knowledge limitations within the physician
community in respect of assessing DMC. It is important
to note that presence of a psychiatric disorder per se is not
sufficient reason to declare a person unable to make a competent
decision about MAID (49). It has repeatedly been shown that
most psychiatric patients are capable of making decisions
about their treatment (50), and that “[. . . ] the prevailing
presumption that certain mental disorders are indicative
of a lack of decision-making capacity—i.e., automatically
render a person incompetent—is persistent but wrong [. . . ]”
[(2), p. 47].
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
PRACTICE
We contend that while some individuals with SPMI may
experience perceived burdensomeness, this does not mean that
all those with SPMI should be routinely excluded from MAID. If
SPMI renders a person’s life unlivable, perceived burdensomeness
as a component of intolerable suffering is not a sufficient reason
to deny them access to MAID if they still have DMC. In this latter
regard, all requests for MAID and DMC evaluation should be
performed to the highest standard by the physicians responsible.
Care should also be taken not to introduce medical paternalism
“by the back door,” as this would reduce the autonomy of
patients with SPMI, who are already particularly vulnerable and
stigmatized [see (51)]. Given the nature of the MAID decision,
those deemed to have DMC will be capable of a level of self-
reflection that includes the ability to take account of their
own social networks, relationships, ties, and obligations to the
extent that these are relevant. It is also clear that maintaining
private or professional relationships often involves dealing with
complex and difficult situations, including significant others
who might try to persuade one to act in a particular way.
Persons with preserved DMC are also capable of reflecting on
the feeling or fact of being a burden to others and evaluating
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this in the context of their own wishes, beliefs, or opinions. The
crux of clinical practice in this context is to evaluate whether
perceived burdensomeness and a related wish to die are aspects
of the underlying SPMI, and whether DMC is compromised
to an extent that cannot be overcome by competent supported
decision making.
We concede that the risk of incorrectly ascribing incapacity
opens the door to routine exclusion of people with SPMI.
However, although capacity evaluation in relation to
MAID is often a matter of fine judgment, patients with
SPMI are not so difficult to evaluate as to warrant a
blanket ban. Indeed, we believe that careful assessment in
these cases can minimize the risk of error. In any event,
avoiding the risk of any possibility of error is no more a
justification for paternalism when dealing with people with
SPMI—including those who report perceived burdensomeness—
than for anyone who might request MAID at the end
of life.
To ensure careful assessment, Shaffer et al. (17) “[. . . ]
strongly encourage jurisdictions that are considering extending
(or have extended) PAD [physician assisted dying] to persons
with a mental disorder to implement additional safeguards
and procedures [. . . ].” (p. 149). Advocating a legal framework
with stricter guidelines, Vandenberghe (46) made the following
recommendation: “[. . . ] even as [a MAID] request is being
assessed and processed, recovery-oriented care should continue
in parallel. This imperative two-track approach ensures that
there is a treatment advocate involved, prevents [MAID] from
being used as an escape by an overwhelmed clinician, and
keeps the focus of care from being narrowed down to death.
Such an approach implies that we don’t give up on patients
during the long evaluation process. We offer support, do our
utmost to reduce suffering and increase comfort, stand by
our patients, foster hope, and remain focused on patients’
strengths and connectedness with others, including ourselves.
We keep striving for a meaningful life and a positive sense
of identity, despite the psychiatric illness and its impact” (p.
886f). That being so, we agree with McPherson et al.’s (30)
recommendation that the concept of perceived burdensomeness
should be incorporated in teaching curricula for professionals
working in end-of-life care.
Future research should seek to more precisely quantify
the contribution of perceived burdensomeness to intolerable
suffering specifically among patients with SPMI, and to what
extent this contributes to the desire for MAID. Roest et al.
(52), den Hartogh (39), and Bleek (32) stressed the importance
of widening the scope of this discussion beyond the patient–
therapist relationship and the family circle to the broader
sociopolitical context. Rehmann-Sutter (36) noted that “[i]n
societies with ‘liberal’ legislation on assisted dying (such as
Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands), a duty of the state
arises: to safeguard a high level of diligence in the decision-
making processes to make sure that everything possible is done
to relieve the situation of care by other means than letting
the patient take her- or himself out of the equation” (p. 447).
According to Shaffer et al. (17), “[t]here are two types of
safeguards: direct (i.e., legislation) and indirect (i.e., professional
guidelines) [. . . ]” (p. 149), and both are of immediate relevance.
We believe that, as safeguards and procedures for MAID,
professional guidelines should not only include the assessment
of intolerable, irremediable suffering and the evaluation of DMC
but also, as part of both, perceived burdensomeness, including
whether the related wish to die is an integral aspect of the
underlying SPMI.
CONCLUSION
Perceived burdensomeness is a reality for patients with SPMI
and can increase their suffering. Where SPMI renders a patient’s
life unlivable, perceived burdensomeness as a component of
intolerable suffering is not a sufficient reason to deny access
to MAID if the patient meets all necessary criteria. We agree
with Shaffer et al.’s (17) suggestion for the implementation
of additional safeguards and procedures to ensure careful
assessment of this vulnerable group when seeking MAID.
Aligning with Hodel et al. (47), we recommend that psychiatrists
should be involved in the assessment process when a person
with SPMI expresses a wish for MAID, especially in cases
of perceived burdensomeness, as there is a need to evaluate
the extent to which this influences the wish for MAID.
Vandenberghe (46) advocated a multidisciplinary approach,
especially in cases of “nonterminal illness.” For patients with
SPMI, an interdisciplinary consideration of the desire for
MAID and the influence of perceived burdensomeness could
be beneficial. We further agree with Vandenberghe’s (46)
suggestion that “[. . . ] recovery-oriented care should continue
in parallel [. . . ]” (p. 886) with assessment of a request for
MAID. In addition, it seems possible that patients with
SPMI might benefit from a palliative care approach (4).
In cases of perceived burdensomeness, this issue must be
addressed in the therapeutic process to alleviate that element
of suffering (28, 32, 34, 35, 37), not least because patients
have indicated that it is difficult to talk about this with their
family (34).
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